The narrow “No” victory in Sunday’s
plebiscite on Colombia’s government-FARC peace agreement shocked both
Colombians and the international community who were preparing for an end to 52
years of internal conflict. Countering polls that indicated that the accord
would be widely approved by the country’s populace, the opposition victory has
now created uncertainty about the product of 4 years of negotiations. Many analysts and opposition voters have
attributed the “No” victory to the view that the accord is too lenient on the
FARC. According to the agreement, members of the FARC that admit their crimes
through truth reconciliations will avoid incarceration and only suffer
ambiguous “restrictions of liberty” and the guerrilla group will be able to organize
into a political party following disarmament.
Many critics to the agreement see these
concessions as impunity. A voter interviewed by the Washington
Post whose brother and uncle were kidnapped by the FARC in the 1990s said: “they
need to change the accord so that there’s some kind of punishment for those who
committed these crimes.” This is a perspective not only common among Colombia’s
“No” voters, but also fundamental to conceptions and debates on post-conflict
justice throughout the last century, originating in the creation of individual
criminal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes
against peace in the Nuremberg trials. Transitional justice has been a tricky
subject for countless divisive, violent conflicts, including the Holocaust,
genocides in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, South African apartheid, Chilean
state terror, and Salvadoran civil war. The Colombian context can learn from
these former cases.
Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri
argue that the “legalist” perspective of criminal justice (punishment for
perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations) has often had
devastating consequences for transitions to sustained peace, especially in
places with a weak rule of law and institutional incapacity for effective
justice. For example, in the former Yugoslavia: “the ICTY’s decision to investigate
rebel atrocities led the guerrillas to destroy evidence of mass graves,
creating a pretext for hardline Slavic Macedonian nationalists to renew
fighting in late November 2001 and to occupy Albanian held terrain” (Snyder,
Vinjamuri 12). Despite the legitimate desires to hold perpetrators accountable
for crimes, strengthen the rule of law, and assign guilt following horrific
violence, Snyder and Vinjamuri argue that trials can provoke backlashes from
perpetrators in the short term and a culture of perpetual resentment and polarization
in the long term. Through a thorough analysis of the results of different forms
of transitional justice following 20th century conflicts, Snyder and
Vinjamuri conclude that amnesties and truth commissions have “often been the
basis for durable peace settlements” (43).
Similarly, Forsythe characterizes punitive
solutions to post-conflict transitions as “judicial romanticism” in that it
views criminal justice as “a panacea for violations of human rights” (Forsythe
90). On the other hand, he asserts that “there are ways of doing good for
individuals, and maybe even advancing certain human rights over time, through
delaying or bypassing criminal justice” (Forsythe 118). Following the South
African apartheid, Nelson Mandela himself advocated for truth and
reconciliation commissions rather than criminal justice in order to “build a
multi-racial rights-protective society” (Forsythe 115).
Victims and their families are
absolutely justified in demanding closure, accountability, and reparations from
perpetrators of violence. However, the question remains: is the long-term goal
of transitional justice sustained peace or reprisal? The experiences of other
conflict-torn countries demonstrate that amnesties, truth reconciliations, or
other alternatives to criminal justice are often more effective in moving the
country forward, particularly following long-term ideological conflicts.
Furthermore, truth commissions often provide more meaningful and culturally
sensitive closure and accountability than punitive criminal justice.
The context of Colombia is even
more complicated considering the variety of actors that have contributed to
violence. Unlike the unilateral state terror in Argentina, or the genocides of
Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, violence in Colombia has been perpetrated from
different sides: from the FARC, the State, paramilitary groups, and other
actors. Assigning responsibility for violence would then have to impute members
from all of these groups, which is highly unlikely.
The peace accord in Colombia is far
from perfect. Nonetheless, it demonstrates a resounding commitment to building
peace in a country afflicted by internal conflict for half a century. Building
peace takes sacrifice and negotiation, but is undoubtedly preferable to the
alternative. Engaging in constructive dialogue about transitional justice is
crucial to promoting peace in a country so desperately ready for it.